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structures through reforms that increase the degree 
of competition. This paper asks whether the reforms 
have had the desired effect and shows, through qual-
itative research, that at least regarding the streaming 
of music, competition has not delivered. Part of the 
reason for this may be that the services required by 
the now competing CMOs have changed.
Abstract:  While the three functions of Col-
lective Management Organisations - to licence use, 
monitor use, and to collect and distribute the revenue 
- have traditionally been accepted as a progression 
towards a natural (national) monopoly, digital exploi-
tation of music may no longer lead to such a fate. The 
European Commission has challenged the traditional 
A. Introduction
1 The licensing of copyright protected works has been 
a feature of the music industry for decades, allowing 
a large variety of users - bars, broadcasters, concert 
venues etc. - to play music as part of the services they 
offer. This system rests on central licensing agencies, 
most commonly known as Collective Management 
Organisations (CMOs). These administer the rights 
of copyright holders from a central point, offering 
licenses to the users. While the system has been in 
place for a long time and has worked reasonably 
well (although not perfectly) for analogue uses, the 
rise of the internet and digital technology has been 
a game-changer. By expanding the possibility of, 
and demand for, cross-border uses, the traditional 
system has come under considerable strain, and is 
now reaching breaking point as new types of services 
such as streaming emerge. These services need to 
license musical works on an EU or global basis to 
use the technology’s full potential. This is difficult 
because, until now, the CMOs in the EU have been 
nationally-based monopolies. To obtain a license that 
covers Europe, 28 different licenses are, in principle 
required. Such an arrangement clashes directly with 
the EU’s ambition to create a Digital Single Market 
(DSM).1 As a result, the current regulatory regime, 
particularly as it relates to CMOs, has become a 
1 For a discussion of the Digital Single Market, see European 
Commission, Digital Single Market- Bringing Down Barriers 
to Unlock Online Opportunities 2015 (available at <http://
ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market/>, last 
accessed 17/12/15).
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prime concern of the EU.
2 The functioning of CMOs in the digital domain is of 
key importance for the DSM.2 The single market is, 
after all, intended to allow for the free movement of 
goods and services across borders, giving EU citizens 
access to what they most prefer. The inability of 
the current copyright system to issue cross-border 
licenses to all users that require them means that 
CMOs can provide services only on a member state 
by member state basis, due to the threat of copyright 
infringement (and therefore high costs) that any 
unlicensed cross-border use would entail.3 The 
result is geo-blocking: individual users are not able 
to access services once they enter another member 
state, even if they have paid for those services. 
Rather than having a single market, online music 
continues to operate through multiple separate 
markets.
3 The EU’s response to this situation has been to issue 
a Directive,4 which is due to be implemented in 2016. 
This Directive formalises competition between CMOs5 
2 See, for example, Intellectual Property Office, Collective 
rights management in the digital single market 
available02015 (at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401225/
collective_rights.pdf>, last accessed 15/4/16).
3 There have been agreements in the past that offered 
MTLs, however, they have either not been renewed (see 
Santiago Agreement), are limited to specific user groups 
(Simulcasting Agreement), or have been found to be contrary 
to competition rules (such as the CISAC Model Agreement). 
For a detailed description of these agreements, please see: 
Guibault and Van Gompel, Collective Management in the 
European Union, in Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2015, 3rd Ed.), 139- 174.
4 Directive on collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights 
in musical works for online use in the internal market 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive).
5 Competition between CMOs for the management of rights 
of rights has been introduced in the case law before. CMOs 
have to be seen as dominant undertakings and are therefore 
subject to competition rules (GVL v. Commission (Case 
7/82, [1983] ECR 483, [1983] CMLR 645); RT v. SABAM (Case 
127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM and NV 
Fonior, [1974] ECR 313, [1974] 2 CMLR 238). The results are 
a number of restrictions on CMOs towards their members. 
For the purpose of this article, the most important are 
the following. It was held that CMOs cannot refuse the 
management of rights by foreigners, even if they are not 
resident in a country. This is especially the case if the CMO 
has a dominant position and quasi monopoly (Case 7/82, 
Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten 
mbH (GVL) v. Commission, [1983] ECR 483; [1983] 3 CMLR 
645). In addition, right holders cannot be required to 
assign all of their rights. (Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en 
Televisie v. SV SABAM and NV Fonior, [1974] ECR 313, [1974] 
2 CMLR 238)), in particular their online rights (Daftpunk) 
(Case C2/37.219, Banghalter et Homem Christo v. SACEM, 6 
August 2002). This is limited by economic viability though. 
A CMO cannot be forced to accept only those rights which 
are expensive to administer ( see for example, Case 127/73, 
and places obligations upon them to serve better the 
interests of users6 and right holders. In this paper, 
we assess the possible outcome of this initiative, and 
argue that there might be more effective ways to 
address the problem posed by creating a DSM. We 
confine our attention to the music market, which 
is feeling the effects of the digital revolution most 
acutely, at least among the creative industries. We 
also focus our attention to the streaming of music. 
Similar issues arise regarding the sales of digital 
music, for example through electronic stores.7
B. Background: The role of the 
CMO before digitalisation
4 As Handke and Towse point out, the licensing market 
for musical works in an analogue world was (and 
remains) highly complex.8 A large number of creators 
and products (typically, artists and songs) have to be 
matched with a similarly large number of diverse 
users. Asymmetry of information in such a situation 
creates prohibitive transaction costs for individual 
licensing between a copyright owner and a user. In 
other words, individual licensing represents a case 
of market failure in which copyright owners and 
Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM and NV Fonior, 
[1974] ECR 313, [1974] 2 CMLR 238, para. 10, 11 and 15).
6 User interests are only indirectly addressed, for example in 
the transparency rules which are meant to give users the 
information they need to choose licenses (see in particular 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive), art. 19- 22.).
7 Some of these issues have been addressed, either through 
coalitions of old structures to create broader organisations 
which can offer bundled clearing of copyrights; or 
through new structures such as Merlin- a right clearance 
organisation which can also offer MTLs. However, not all 
Copyright Management Societies in the EU are members 
of such structures. Thus transaction costs are incurred to 
provide pan-EU availability of digital music. As Gómez and 
Martens note: “We find that in August 2013 there was still 
substantial variation in availability in the iTunes country 
stores across the EU DSM. Less than half of all song tracks 
and music albums are available in all EU27 country stores. 
Overall, music availability in the EU DSM is somewhere 
between 73 and 82 per cent of what it could be in a fully 
open DSM where all song tracks and albums would be 
available in all EU27 countries.” (Gómez and Martens, 
Language, Copyright And Geographic Segmentation in 
the EU Digital Single Market for Music and Film, JRC/IPTS 
Digital Economy Working Paper 2015, (available at <http://
ssrn.Com/Abstract=2603144>, last accessed 15/4/16), 3-4. 
However, Gómez and Martens do acknowledge that matters 
are improving. It should also be noted that some right 
holders’ business strategies relies on fragmented markets to 
maximise profits, as for example in the audio-visual sector. 
These attitudes may oppose the aims of the Commission but 
nonetheless also affect the availability of pan- European 
licenses.
8 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15).
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the users would both lose out. The copyright owner 
would not generate the income they seek while the 
user is not able to legally play the music they want. 
The solution to this problem has involved several 
intermediaries, including CMOs streamlining the 
financial transaction between the creator and user.
5 CMOs act to reduce the market failure.9 In general, 
they have three functions: 1) to license works for 
specific uses; 2) to monitor the use of works and 
collect the revenue; and 3) to distribute the revenue 
to its members.10 The CMOs collect the revenue for 
low-value, high volume secondary uses; that is, uses 
where the individual licensing fee is small but the 
number of licenses which need to be issued add 
up to a substantial revenue stream. CMOs manage 
the rights of its members collectively, providing 
blanket licenses to users. By managing the rights 
collectively, they are able to lower the transaction 
costs as well as provide a stable licensing framework. 
In economic terms, they enable the market to 
function by ensuring copyright effectiveness in 
circumstances where copyright owners cannot 
contract directly. A blanket license gives users – 
especially broadcasters – the right to use any music 
within the CMO’s repertoire. The blanket licenses 
reduce the transaction costs because they do not 
require negotiations on the price or the exact size of 
the rights bundle for each individual transaction.11
6 CMOs have been a core feature of the licensing 
market within the EU (and beyond) for more than a 
century. Based on a system of reciprocal agreements 
between CMOs, they have been able to license a 
world-wide repertoire. A user can therefore use any 
song they want and only pay their local CMO. The 
transfer of funds across borders is carried out by the 
CMOs themselves and is of no concern to the user. As 
a result, CMOs have established a system of national 
9 Haunss, The Changing Role of Collecting Societies on the 
Internet, Internet Policy Review 2013, 1-8, Handke and 
Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies, SSRN 
2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 14/12/15).
10 Andersen, Kozul- Wright, Z. and Kozul- Wright, R, 
Copyrights, Competition and Development: The Case of the 
Music Industry, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade 
And Development 2000 (available at: <http://unctad.org/
en/docs/dp_145.en.pdf>, last accessed 15/4/16), 21.
11 There is an extensive economics literature on what is often 
termed “buffet” pricing inspired by the “all-you-can-eat 
buffets”. Much of this literature has focused on behavioural 
aspects, in particular those which lead to obesity, which 
does not appear to be particularly relevant in our context. 
The behavioural literature is summarised in Lambrecht 
and Skiera, Paying Too Much and Being Happy About It: 
Existence, Causes, and Consequences of Tariff-Choice 
Biases, Journal of Marketing Research 2006, 212–223 as 
well as Just and Wansink, The flat-rate pricing paradox: 
conflicting effects of “all-you-can-eat” buffet pricing, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 2011, 193-200.
monopolies, which do not compete with each other, 
but instead operate under a set of agreements which 
determine the cost of licenses. While this broad 
coverage in works, the economies of scale, and the 
resulting monopoly status contribute to efficient 
licensing in practice, it is also the source of the 
European Commission’s main concern. While the 
licences are “blanket”, their price may well differ 
according to the type of organisation that requests 
the blanket licence. No stakeholder is able to judge 
the price charged and the lack of a viable alternative 
has meant that a copyright holder has no incentive 
to defect to a rival CMO, no matter how dissatisfied 
they are.12 The CMO’s monopoly status has given rise 
to typical concerns often attributed to monopolies— 
namely the potential abuse of a dominant position.13 
Market prices cannot be established; neither for the 
users in terms of how much they should pay for their 
license, nor for the copyright owners, in relation to 
the cost of administration that the system entails.14
7 EU case law has established that the CMOs are 
undertakings which hold a dominant position, 
meaning that they are subject to the full force of 
competition law, including both article 101 TFEU 
relating to concerted practices and article 102 
TFEU relating to the abuse of a dominant position.15 
This required restrictions on how they operated. 
However, the CJEU also ruled that CMOs serve the 
public interest, and that, therefore, competition 
law was not to be applied rigidly.16 In other words, 
while the Court found the monopoly status and 
reciprocal agreements justifiable in the broader 
12 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15).
13 Assessing such abuses is made complicated by the two-sided 
nature of the market, where the intermediary can decide 
from which side of the market, copyright holders or users, 
to extract rent, either in terms of funds or a “quiet life”.
14 Kretschmer, Access and Reward in the Information Society: 
Regulating the Collective Management of Copyright (Poole: 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management, 
2005), 7.
15 Graber, Collective Rights Management, Competition Policy 
and Cultural Diversity: EU Law Making at a Crossroads, 
I-Call Working Paper 2012 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161763>, last accessed 
15/4/16), 6.
16 See for example: Case C-395/87 Ministère Public v Tournier, 
[1989] ECR-2521, para. 24; Lucazeau v SACEM ECR 2811; GVL 
v. Commission (Case 7/82, [1983] ECR 483, [1983] CMLR 645; 
Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM 
ECR 51 313. All of these cases involved the application of 
competition law and recognised that there are legitimate 
interests that can limit its application in practice. Also 
discussed in: Graber, Collective Rights Management, 
Competition Policy and Cultural Diversity: EU Law Making 
at a Crossroads, I-Call Working Paper 2012 (available 
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2161763>, last accessed 15/4/16), 6.
Regulating Collective Management Organisations by Competition
2016259 3
public interest, it also recognised the negative 
impact the system could have on users and right 
holders. For this reason, CMOs are required to offer 
users reasonable licensing terms, while at the same 
time giving their members as much freedom to 
administer their rights as independently as possible 
(as long as this is consistent with the functioning of 
the CMO as a whole). Copyright owners should be 
able to administer their rights individually insofar 
as this does not impose undue costs on the CMO. For 
example, while withdrawing all one’s works or the 
online rights attached to those works is acceptable, 
withdrawing the online rights for works A, B and 
C, but not D, and G, is not, because keeping track 
would be too expensive for the CMO.17 In essence, 
the regulations have attempted to balance the 
threat of monopolisation against effective rights 
administration.18 However, given that there was no 
viable alternative to the CMO system the Commission 
tolerated it. The rise of the internet has changed the 
rules of the game.
8 It should be noted that some authors have questioned 
the treatment accorded to CMOs in the analogue 
world. Katz in particular challenges the claim that in 
the analogue world the CMO is a natural monopoly.19 
He observes that more than one CMO may operate 
in a single territory. Unlike most other countries, 
where the CMO is a monopolist, the US has three 
CMOs managing musical works (ASCAP, BMI and 
SESAC) of which one (SESAC) is rather smaller than 
the others (less than 5% in 2000)20 and has coexisted 
with ASCAP since 1931 and all three have been in 
the market since 1941. The traditional argument in 
favour of natural monopoly — economies of scale 
— is not compatible with the persistent existence of 
such a small firm.
9 Katz reminds us that, while the CMOs charge for 
a blanket licence, they do not charge all users the 
same price.21 Thus they use their monopoly power 
17 Kretschmer, Access and Reward in the Information Society: 
Regulating the Collective Management of Copyright (Poole: 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management, 
2005), 5.
18 Dietz, Legal Regulation of Collective Management of 
Copyright (Collecting Societies Law) in Western and Eastern 
Europe, Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 2002, 
908.
19 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 
541-593.
20 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 554.
21 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 
541-593.
to engage in third degree price discrimination22, 
charging different prices to different types of 
businesses, a practice which has an ambiguous 
effect on both total and consumer surplus. Katz also 
points out that the existence of different licences 
for performance of the work adds an extra tool to 
the CMO to practice successful price discrimination 
because it enables the CMO to identify the nature 
of each user.23
10 In a supplementary article, Katz explores how his 
argument would apply in the digital world. Given 
his conclusion for the analogue world, it is hardly 
a surprise that he is sceptical about the monopoly 
argument.24 However, given when it was written, 
his paper has to engage in speculation.  While it 
undoubtedly was ahead of its time in 2006, and 
many of the speculations have come to pass, it adds 
little to the current debate. However, it does help us 
understand why the Commission viewed the digital 
world differently when it comes to competition.
C. The Digital Challenge
11 As digital technology, and especially the internet, 
rose in importance, the needs of users changed 
dramatically. A new breed of services came to the 
fore, most notably, the streaming platforms (Spotify, 
Deezer, Amazon Music, etc.). They differ from 
analogue users in the kind of licenses they require. 
Analogue users only require territorial licenses; their 
services do not cross national borders25 and therefore 
they do not require licenses that extend further. 
However, the internet (and digitalisation) creates 
the possibility of easy access to music irrespective of 
tariff barriers or broadcasting regulations. Any legal 
service seeking to exploit these possibilities requires 
multi-territorial licenses. To cater to this need, CMOs 
reacted first by offering Simulcasting agreements, 
providing cross-border licenses to internet radio. 
The Commission accepted this solution as a 
22 Firms engaging in third degree price discrimination offer 
different prices to different identifiable groups of buyers – a 
classic example is different prices for different age groups.
23 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 550.
24 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
New technologies and the administration of performing 
rights. Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2006, 
245-284.
25 While strictly speaking not true, this is the assumption 
which has been made in the industry, motivated by a view 
that Broadcasters are (supposed to) focus on their national 
audience, not least because of language barriers. The 
exception is broadcasting with the Simulcasting Agreement 
which resolves the issue by treating broadcasters as 
geographically limited users and therefore as essentially 
the same as analogue users.
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permissible exception under article 101(3) TFEU 
(which began in 2004).26 However, it remained the 
exception, even as the Commission came to realise 
that digital technology was not only changing user 
requirements but the system as a whole.
12 The driver of change was not just user demand, 
but the very nature of licensing itself. Handke 
and Towse have argued that primarily, digital 
technology makes the gathering and processing 
of information much easier. Secondly, they argue 
that it enhances market signalling: on one hand, 
the use of individual works can now be assessed 
with more precision than before; on the other 
hand, there is potential for price discrimination 
and charging every user what they are willing 
to pay. Finally, as a result of these factors, CMOs 
are able to reduce their costs.27 New technologies 
such as Digital Rights Management (DRM)28, which 
enable rights to be administered individually,29 can 
enhance efficiency. This of course undermines the 
CMO’s justification for their monopoly status,30 
as there are now real alternatives to them. 
 
26 Guibault and Van Gompel, Collective Management in the 
European Union, in Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2015, 3rd Ed.), 160-161. Other agreements such as 
the CISAC model contract (leading to the cases European 
Commission, Commission Decision of 16/07/2008 relating 
to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 
53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC) 
(available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf>, last accessed 
17/12/15) and the CJEU decision CISAC v. European 
Commission (Case T-442/08)) and the Santiago Agreement 
(Notification of cooperation agreements (Case COMP/
C2/38.126 – BUMA, GEMA, PRS, SACEM),O.J. C. 145/2 of 
17.05.2001) as well as the Barcelona Agreement (Notification 
of cooperation agreements (Case COMP/C-2/38.377 – BIEM 
Barcelona Agree-ments), O.J. C. 132/18 of 4.06.2002) were 
found anti-competitive.
27 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15), 13.
28 In this context, DRM is a tool to control the type of access 
one has to digital music. It controls both access and usage. 
For a discussion of the merits of DRM, see e.g. Doctorow, 
What happens with digital rights management in the real 
world?, Guardian, 5 February 2014 (available at: <https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2014/feb/05/
digital-rights-management>, last accessed 15/4/16).
29 Kretschmer, Access and Reward in the Information Society: 
Regulating the Collective Management of Copyright (Poole: 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management, 
2005), 17.
30 Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights, WIPO 2002 (available at: <http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/855/wipo_pub_855.pdf>, last 
accessed 15/4/16), 98.
D. A new regulatory regime
13 The change in the Commission’s attitude first became 
clear when it refused to accept the Santiago and 
Barcelona Agreements, which aimed to extend the 
analogue licensing system to the digital domain.31 
The Commission’s attitude was made even clearer 
when it rejected CISAC’s model contracts. CISAC, 
the world-wide umbrella organisation for CMOs, 
devised model contracts to allow its members to 
offer multi-repertoire, multi-territorial licenses. 
The contracts had three core features: a national 
allocation clause, an exclusivity clause, and a non-
intervention clause. Combined, the latter two had 
the effect of maintaining the national delineation 
of CMOs, guaranteeing their monopolies. While 
these clauses were not new, the Commission now 
considered them unjustified— digital technology 
meant that a local presence was not required to 
ensure efficient enforcement.32 The Commission 
argued that digitalisation enabled CMOs to compete 
with each other in the field of digital exploitation, 
meaning online use in practice. Overall, it found 
the model contract contrary to competition rules 
under article 101 TFEU,33 although this decision was 
overturned by the General Court in 2013.34 Instead, 
CMOs should, the Commission believed, compete 
with each other to attract members and users. This 
in turn should lead to increased efficiency in the 
rights administration, aiding the emergence of new 
markets.35 The Commission shifted from viewing the 
CMO as a necessary evil for ensuring the effective 
licensing of works, to seeing it an as unnecessary 
anti-competitive undertaking which harmed both 
right holders and users. This stance was to become 
clear Commission policy. 
14 While Katz’s analysis casts doubt on the survival of 
the past monopolising elements of collective rights 
management, the move to digital exploitation 
could, at least in theory, give rise to a new 
monopoly element.36 This has so far attracted 
31 Frabboni, Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights: achievements and problems of institutional efforts 
towards harmonization, in: Derclaye (ed.), Research 
Handbook in the Future of EU Copyright (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2009), 373-400.
32 Guibault and Van Gompel, Collective Management in the 
European Union, in Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights (Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2015, 3rd Ed.), 162.
33 European Commission, Commission Decision of 16/07/2008 
relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/C2/38.698 
– CISAC) (available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf>, last 
accessed 17/12/15), 220-223.
34 CISAC v. European Commission (Case T-442/08).
35 Sparrow, Music Distribution and the Internet: A Legal Guide 
for the Music Business (Aldershot: Gower, 2006), 1.
36 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
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little commentary. With more data available 
electronically, a comprehensive database of all 
right holders and associated material would not 
only be essential, but also display increasing return 
to scale both in its creation and maintenance. For 
full functionality it is important that the database 
is comprehensive. Given the cost of establishment 
and maintenance, it would be inefficient to have 
two parallel fully comprehensive databases. By 
contrast, the other elements - such as monitoring 
and collecting money - seem to have less of a claim to 
monopoly status once services become digital. Given 
the international nature of such a database, there 
is a serious issue as to who regulates the terms of 
access and how the database is to be funded. Building 
on existing databases held by CMOs, one possibility 
would be for these to set up an institution to hold, 
transform and maintain these databases. This has to 
some extent already happened. Most CMO databases 
(and all of the ones examined here) are part of CIS-
Net, the most comprehensive database for musical 
works and their corresponding rights. It is owned by 
FastTrack, which, in turn, is owned by the CMOs. The 
question is whether competition among the CMOs 
(in the EU) is sufficient to generate a comprehensive 
database, whilst at the same time engendering a 
meaningful and valuable choice.
15 In 2005, the Commission reported on the lack of 
cross-border licenses for users in the online market. 
It proposed that rights holders should be free to 
choose their CMO, the rights that they assign to it and 
their associated territorial reach.37 The underlying 
rationale is a typical competition remedy: by giving 
the individual the choice over the provider, they 
can choose the service that most closely matches 
their preferences. In other words, by allowing 
right holders to vote with their feet, CMOs would 
be bound to become more efficient in an effort to 
not lose members. Furthermore, CMOs would issue 
pan-European licenses, and by choosing their CMO 
carefully, rights holders would be able to ensure that 
each CMO would be able to offer coherent bundles.38 
The Commission’s recommendation rejected 
the analogue services’ use of reciprocal licence 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 
541-593, Katz, The potential demise of another natural 
monopoly: New technologies and the administration 
of performing rights. Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 2006, 245-284.
37 European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 
18 May 2005 on Collective Cross-Border Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music 
Services (2005/737/EC)” (available at <http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:3200
5H0737&from=EN>, last accessed 17/12/15).
38 Note that rights holders would have an incentive to seek out 
CMOs who “managed” material similar to their own to give 
that CMO more bargaining power vis-à-vis the users.
agreements and full harmonisation.39 Their approach 
became law in the 2014 CMO Directive 2014/26/EU. 
The Directive focused on more competition rather 
than on harmonisation or an extension of the 
traditional system of reciprocal agreements. The 
Directive aims at providing an environment in which 
competition can be fully effective. It sets minimum 
standards for the transparency and supervision of 
CMOs by their members and therefore the right 
holders.40 Both of these are typical competition 
remedies, which have been applied to areas such as 
the energy market. In the case of the music industry, 
EU policy is based on the distinction between the 
analogue and the digital licensing market for musical 
works, and the need to alter the role played by CMOs 
in the latter. However, the major CMOs are already 
meeting the Directive’s demands,41 so the question 
is whether the legislative intervention will have its 
intended effect. After all, if the database existed 
and access was regulated/mandated, then the right 
holder would genuinely have choice based on the 
quality of service.42 To answer our question, we 
investigated the problems that actually affect users 
in the digital realm.
E. Methodology
16 To understand the current state of licensing in the 
EU, we compared the experience of an analogue 
user with that of one who seeks a license for online 
exploitation. We simulated the path a potential 
broadcaster or web-streaming service would 
follow in acquiring a license, starting with the first 
search to identify CMOs all the way to the final 
license. It is assumed that the broadcaster seeks a 
multi-repertoire, single-territory license because 
they want to be able to use all kinds of music in 
their programming which, by the nature of the 
broadcasting sector, is assumed to reach a national 
audience. By contrast, a web-streaming service would 
also want to offer all kinds of music but on a multi-
territorial basis, making its programmes accessible 
around the world, or at least within Europe to fully 
exploit the potential of the Single European Market. 
39 Kretschmer, Access and Reward in the Information Society: 
Regulating the Collective Management of Copyright (Poole: 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management, 
2005), 13-14.
40 Directive on collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights 
in musical works for online use in the internal market 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive), Part III.
41 Schroff and Street, The politics of the digital single 
market: the case of copyright, competition and collective 
management organisations (forthcoming).
42 For music, there may be an unnecessary stumbling block as 
rights can only be assigned on an exclusive basis to a CMO 
and therefore not to more than one collecting agent at the 
same time.
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We used these two licensing scenarios to explore the 
practical issues raised by providing multi-repertoire, 
cross-national content.
17 The empirical research was designed in such a way 
as to give a realistic picture of the situation and 
challenges faced by practitioners. For this reason, it 
was carried out by a research associate who has legal 
training but is not working in the field of intellectual 
property or licensing copyright material. In our 
view, this mimics the experience of those individuals 
who have to acquire licenses for commercial 
services. The researcher was asked to keep track of 
how she identified relevant organisations, noting 
down the challenges that she encountered. We chose 
a representative set of European case studies: the 
UK, France, Germany and Sweden. The findings are 
striking: while the analogue user finds a system in 
place to satisfy their licensing needs, the same is not 
true for those who want to run streaming services.
F. Findings: the problems 
for online users
18 The main finding is that CMOs are either unable or 
unwilling to satisfy the demand of online-services. 
When a broadcaster seeks a license, all of our case 
studies were able to provide them with a multi-
repertoire license for the rights in musical works. 
This was because of the reciprocal agreements 
that CMOs have with each other. In this sense, the 
broadcaster has in this sense access to a one-stop-
shop. Table 1 below summarises the steps taken as 
well as the key difficulties in obtaining the right 
to make copyrighted content available across 
borders in the case of broadcasting. It is clear from 
Table 1 that there are only limited difficulties in 
obtaining a licence for traditional broadcasting. 
19 Table 1: Broadcasting
France Germany Sweden UK
Licenses 
Required
SACEM (covers 
other CMOs for 
musical works)
SCPP/ SPFF 
GEMA
GVL
STIM
SAMI
IFPI
PRS/ MCPS
PPL
Information 
on Coverage 
Yes Yes Limited Yes
Broadcasting 
Tariff 
available 
online 
Yes Yes No Yes
Indemnity for 
Licensees
(coverage 
of non-
members) 
No Limited 
(presumption 
of 
management)
No Limited 
(presumption of 
management in 
some cases)
Information 
available in 
English
Partial (does 
not include 
substantive 
licensing 
information)
Partial (does 
not include 
substantive 
licensing 
information)
Yes Yes
20 In contrast, Table 2 below demonstrates the 
considerably greater difficulties encountered in 
obtaining licences for web-streaming. The licenses 
for online uses are a lot more complicated, not least 
because the descriptions used by the CMOs are very 
vague. Although some multi-territorial licenses exist, 
it is not clear which works are covered by them. For 
example, in the UK it is apparent that PRS, the CMO 
for songwriters, composers and publishers, is able 
to license the Anglo-American repertoire of certain 
publishers on a multi-national basis. However, there 
is no way to check what is actually included in this 
description. They are not blanket licenses like the 
ones available to broadcasters in the analogue 
system. This means in practice that more than one 
license is necessary to cover the same category of 
works, increasing the cost for the user.
21 Secondly, just because the license is described as 
multi-territorial, it does not follow that this involves 
EU-wide coverage.43 For example, the French CMO 
SACEM is only able to license France, Luxembourg 
and Monaco — the three countries in which it is 
the main CMO anyway. It would have always been 
able to license these even without a change in EU 
policy.44 Similarly, the other CMOs only offer licenses 
that cover a very limited number of countries, but 
none of them provided clear information as to what 
countries were included. As a result, not only is 
there no comparable one-stop shop, the territorial 
gaps in the license are also unclear, giving rise to 
major concerns regarding what is allowed. In sum, 
while a broadcaster is provided with a one-stop-
43 A similar problem was observed for the sale of digital 
music, see Gómez and Martens, Language, Copyright And 
Geographic Segmentation in the EU Digital Single Market for 
Music and Film, JRC/IPTS Digital Economy Working Paper 
2015, (available at <http://ssrn.Com/Abstract=2603144>, 
last accessed 15/4/16).
44 The CMO Directive has been an issue at EU level for a 
significant amount of time before the Directive was finalised. 
It is therefore possible that stakeholders anticipate the 
changes early on knowing that they will have to comply at 
some point. Having said this, SACEM has been able to issue 
licenses for these three territories for years. It is therefore 
unlikely that changes in EU policy had an effect on SACEM 
in this case.
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shop to satisfy their licensing needs, the same 
route is not available to online services wishing 
to operate across borders. In fact, they struggle 
with a more fundamental problem — a lack of 
information about the coverage of the license. 
22 Table 2: Web-streaming
France Germany Sweden UK
Relevant 
CMOs
SACEM but 
does not cover 
phonograms or 
performances
GEMA but 
does not cover 
phonograms 
or 
performances
STIM but 
does not 
cover 
phonograms 
or 
performances 
PRS but does 
not cover 
phonograms 
or 
performances
MTL Licenses Not available. 
SACEM offers a 
license limited 
to specific 
territories but 
not truly MTL.
No information 
available from 
other CMOs
Not available.
GEMA offers 
an online 
tariff covering 
Germany and 
some limited 
multi-national 
licenses 
but not 
Europe- wide.
No online 
tariff by GVL 
Not available.
STIM offers 
some 
limited MTL, 
especially for 
Scandinavia.
No 
information 
available 
from other 
CMOs
Not available.
PRS/ MCPS 
offers a 
license limited 
to specific 
territories but 
not truly MTL.
No 
information 
available for 
PPL
Tariff 
available 
online
Only SACEM 
for limited 
territories
Only GEMA 
for limited 
territories
Only for 
STIM for 
limited 
territories
Only for 
PRS/ MCPS 
for limited 
territories 
Indemnity for 
Licensees
(extent to 
which non- 
members are 
covered) 
No Limited 
(presumption 
of 
management)
No Limited 
(presumption 
of 
management 
in some cases)
Information 
available in 
English
Partial (does 
not include 
substantive 
licensing 
information)
Partial (does 
not include 
substantive 
licensing 
information) 
Yes Yes
23 A second notable insight from the two tables 
is the similarities across the countries and 
hence the relevant CMOs. If competition 
was driving new or better licensing services, 
one would expect to see more variation. 
 
 
G. The Directive and the 
limitations of competition 
24 It would appear from our research that the Directive 
not only offers no solution, but in fact worsens the 
problem in some areas. The reasons can be found 
in its inadequate conceptualisation of copyright, 
especially its dynamics and the interests involved. 
In fact, in its current form, it is likely to make the 
situation more difficult for the majority of authors 
and users, only really benefitting a small group of 
large right holders.
I. The User Lost in the Labyrinth
25 The real losers of the changes are the users in the 
online environment. Having blanket licenses, as 
broadcasters do, means that most of the identification 
costs associated with licensing is carried by the CMO. 
They have to identify the relevant right holders, and 
they have to transfer revenues to sister CMOs for the 
repertoire that is used. In the digital environment, 
the cost is shifted entirely onto the user. Online users 
however, have to identify the relevant right holders 
because CMOs are not able to offer blanket licenses. 
Instead, the user needs to contact a large number of 
CMOs, hubs aggregating the repertoire of different 
CMOs, and even individual right holders.
26 Where the local CMO cannot provide licenses with 
multi-territorial cover, the user has to contact the 
CMOs in all member states as well as those right 
holders that have withdrawn their rights.45 This 
poses major problems for all aspects of the licensing 
process. First, there is the problem of identifying 
the repertoire which requires an additional license 
and the right holders associated with it.46 As we 
have seen, statements about the scope of the 
repertoire and rights managed by the CMO can 
be very vague, rendering it difficult to tell what is 
and is not included. Databases, such as CIS-Net, are 
45 An alternative would be to “boycott” songs which were not 
obviously covered by readily available licences. This may 
lead to either pressure from the rights holders of those 
songs to have them included or to migration of those rights 
holders to another CMO.
46 How big the problem is depends on the activism of the 
rights holders. If they are very active users of the services, 
they will identify which CMO offers the best home in terms 
of repertoire and shift their licences to that CMO. More 
generally it is important not to treat the rights holders as 
passive actors.
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not publicly accessible.47 As a result, the only way48 
a user could guarantee a multi-repertoire, multi-
territorial blanket style license would be to contact 
all CMOs or the necessary combination of hubs and 
CMOs. This difficulty is exacerbated by the absence 
of authoritative and complete lists to identify 
CMOs, especially across borders. Our research 
revealed (especially the second row of Table 2) that 
it is difficult to identify all relevant CMOs without 
resorting to the academic literature — a resource 
which is not easily accessible to the general public. In 
fact, determining which CMOs need to be contacted 
has proved to be yet more complex because the 
information provided is vague. A potential user has 
to read around the topic, relying on blogs and similar 
searches. While this may work in practice, the lack 
of verifiable information is a source of concern. 
Furthermore, while CMOs provide significant 
amounts of information on their homepages, it 
tends to be in their national language. In cases where 
sections have been translated into English, they are 
often significantly smaller. In particular, translations 
of licensing forms are not available. By comparison 
(Table 1), broadcasting tariffs are clearly accessible 
and explained by all the relevant organisations on 
their websites.
27 Given the complexity of the task, users can never 
be sure if they have actually covered everything 
and potentially expensive infringement claims 
remain a possibility. Given the problem of securing 
the necessary complete clearance, one might 
reasonably wonder whether it would be better not 
just for the user, but possibly also overall, if it was 
accepted that there might be occasional copyright 
violations but that these would be resolved through 
court settlements.49 The key issues here are: what 
the costs and fines are in cases of infringement; 
whether the fine is proportional to the loss suffered 
by a rights holder; and whether the latter ought to 
have a duty to make it clear which CMO or other 
vehicle is used for revenue gathering. The extent 
of the damages depends too on the type of business 
requiring the licence. In the case of YouTube-style 
ones, they will be told to take something down. If 
they do not comply reasonably fast, then they will 
be held liable. If the service is a Spotify-style one 
47 An interesting question is whether an exclusion could 
be challenged on competition grounds as an abuse of 
dominance. The databases may be seen as essential facilities 
to which some users might be able to force access in return 
for a reasonable fee.
48 Given the current set-up. As Katz points out, there are 
alternative solutions if the rights holders and publishers 
are ready to embrace them. Inspiration for this could 
potentially be drawn from the e-book market. (Katz, The 
potential demise of another natural monopoly: Rethinking 
the collective administration of performing rights, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 541-593.)
49 See Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 
2103.
(i.e. no user uploads), then the service would be 
liable straight away as licenses have to be sought 
before the service is made available. One question 
is whether the strategic re-assigning of rights can 
be used to deceive or trick users in order to cash in 
later, essentially by acting in a manner equivalent 
to patent trolls.
28 There is very little information available on how 
much licensees have to pay as a result of licensing 
disputes. Most disputes are settled out of court and 
the details are kept confidential, even if they involve 
a large number of plaintiffs complaining against 
a licensing fee.50 One of the few exceptions is the 
example of NSM Music which was ordered to pay 
£85,000 plus interest and legal costs after it lost a 
licensing dispute with PRS for Music.51 However, the 
claims involved in these cases are substantial. In the 
long-running dispute between the German GEMA 
and YouTube, the demands reached €1.6 million for 
the infringement of 1,000 songs that were uploaded 
by users without consent.52 In fact, it demanded 0.37 
euro cent for each time a song is played.53 It is easy 
to see how this could lead to very high costs once 
the provider is found liable.54
II. Everyone Loses Out: the Income
29 The complexity of the current system is also likely 
to lead to an overall lower licensing income, simply 
because users cannot manoeuvre the system 
efficiently. As a result, they either do not offer a 
service on the scale they would prefer, or they do 
not pay all rights holders as they should.
30 Looking at the system in practice clarifies this. 
Today, those CMOs that are able to offer truly multi- 
territorial licenses are managing Hubs. Hubs refer 
to the separate legal entities founded by a (large-
50 ITV et al v PRS and MCPS, Consent Order by the Copyright 
Tribunal (cases CT 117,188, 199) (available at <http://www.
bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIntelP/2012/o011911.pdf>, last 
accessed 15/4/16).
51 PRS for Music, NSM Music ordered to pay PRS for 
Music license fees 2011 (<http://www.prsformusic.
com/aboutus/press/latestpressreleases/pages/
nsmmusicorderedtopayprsformusiclicencefees.aspx>, last 
accessed 15/4/16).
52 LG München I: Keine Haftung des Plattformbetreibers für 
Urheberrechtsverletzungen, MMR 2015, 831. The revision 
was also turned down: OLG München: YouTube schuldet 
GEMA keinen Schadenersatz, MMR-Aktuell 2016, 375539.
53 Schadensersatzprozess: Gericht weist erneut Gema-Klage 
gegen YouTube ab, Der Spiegel 28 Jan 2016 (<http://www.
spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/youtube-gema-verliert-
vor-olg-muenchen-a-1074418.html>, last accessed 15/4/16).
54 It should also be noted that YouTube was not found liable in 
this case due to secondary liability issues. The fee demand 
itself was not determined as unreasonable.
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scale) right holder for the purpose of licensing. 
Most of them cooperate very closely or are even 
managed by one or more CMOs. As a result, these 
CMOs are able to license this repertoire in addition to 
their own repertoire. However, the CMO which had 
originally held these works will not be able to issue 
a license anymore.55 Major publishers have bundled 
their rights in these Hubs but the repertoire is not 
universal. Instead, repertoire coverage is divided 
by publisher or even by sections of a publisher’s 
repertoire (for example, Latin-American or Anglo-
American music). The management of Hubs overlaps 
so that specific CMOs are able to license rights of 
more than one repertoire. For example, PRS for 
Music in the UK is involved in “Peer Music Publishing 
Anglo-American repertoire, Imagem Anglo-American 
repertoire, IMPEL Anglo-American repertoire, CELAS and 
SOLAR56 (EMI and Sony/ ATV Anglo- American repertoire) 
and Warner Chappell Music Publishing repertoire as a 
PEDL partner”.57 However, depending on what type 
of repertoire the user requires, it is likely that they 
will have to contact more than one CMO to cover all 
the required rights. The multi-repertoire license has 
been sacrificed for multi-territorial coverage as the 
licenses do not combine both.
31 In addition, these Hubs cover only musical works. All 
other types of works for which licenses are required 
cannot be cleared this way. Record labels which 
own the rights in the performance and phonogram 
usually manage their rights individually, but on 
a multi-territorial basis. The exception is Merlin 
which licenses for a range of Independent labels on 
a multi-territorial basis.58 There is also some limited 
55 Exploitation contracts that CMOs have with the right holder 
do usually require the exclusive assignment of rights. The 
Directive does not actually prohibit that. As a result, when 
the rights are withdrawn, they are usually withdrawn 
entirely, meaning that the original CMO does not manage 
them anymore. The right holder is still able to license non-
commercial uses directly (article 5(3)) but these are not 
relevant for this study. It should be noted though that if the 
MTLs are based on the passport system, meaning that CMO 
1 has mandated CMO 2 to manage the online licensing under 
article 29 of the CMO Directive, then these agreements are 
not exclusive. However, this is not the case for the HUBs 
discussed here as these have the rights entrusted to them 
directly.
56 SOLAR combines the Hubs from PAECOL (GEMA) and CELAS. 
GEMA, Sony/ ATV Launches Joint Venture with PRS for 
Music and GEMA (<https://www.gema.de/en/aktuelles/
sonyatv_launches_joint_venture_with_prs_for_music_
and_gema-1/>, last accessed 14/9/15).
57 PRS for Music. 2015. “Multi-Territorial Licensing” (<https://
www.prsformusic.com/users/broadcastandonline/
onlinemobile/multiterritorylicensing/Pages/default.aspx>, 
last accessed 10/9/15).
58 Merlin is a rights clearance organisation that manages the 
rights on behalf of independent labels. In difference to other 
organisations in this area, its licenses cover more than one 
territory. In other words, the user can license the rights held 
by many different independent labels in a one-stop-shop 
by contacting Merlin. They do not have to go back to the 
cooperation for cross-border licensing among the 
CMOs in this area. For example, GVL, the German 
CMO for performances and phonograms, offers 
multi-territory licenses, but these cover only 20 
member states59 and is therefore not sufficient for 
EU-wide clearance, which for example Europeana60 
requires. Europeana only accepts works which will 
be accessible in all EU member states.61 As a result, 
it would be necessary in most cases to contact the 
record label in order to clear the rights in the records 
and performances; contacting the CMOs alone would 
not be sufficient as they cannot provide adequate 
MTL coverage. Finally, there is still no authoritative 
list of Hubs and CMOs and of which works and rights 
are covered, making the process more laborious.62 
As a result, the MTL licensing of musical works is 
entirely divorced from other related rights, even 
when they are intrinsically linked - such as musical 
works and performances.
32 In practice, finding Hubs takes a significant amount 
of effort in practice. They are not prominently 
featured or promoted by the CMOs. There is also no 
database or similar facility to help users determine if 
there is a Hub able to provide them with the license 
they seek. Furthermore, even these projects are 
very limited in scope. In fact, most focus is on the 
Anglo- American repertoire. These Hubs also do not 
have separate homepages with licensing facilities 
that can be contacted directly; they are managed by 
the CMOs. Thus, the number of potential actors has 
increased, rather than decreased - another step away 
from the one-stop-shop that broadcasters enjoy.63 If 
musical works cannot be licensed, incomes cannot 
be generated and therefore the incentivising effect 
of copyright is itself weakened.
labels. It is an issue though that the actual membership is 
not known and therefore may not represent a specific Indie 
label in question. (<http://www.merlinnetwork.org/>, last 
accessed 10/9/15).
59 GVL, Länderliste Web_radio (available at <https://www.gvl.
de/rechtenutzer/webradio/laenderliste-webradio>, last 
accessed 10/9/15).
60 Europeana is the common gateway where users can access 
materials digitised and hosted by European cultural 
heritage institutions. It can be accessed here: <http://www.
europeana.eu/portal/>. The example is used here because it 
has been actively promoted at EU level.
61 GVL, Länderliste Webradio (available at <https://www.gvl.
de/rechtenutzer/webradio/laenderliste-webradio>, last 
accessed 10/9/15).
62 The CMO Directive does envisage such a list and requires 
the Commission to make it public. However, this has not 
happened yet. (Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive), art. 
39.
63 This highlights the fundamental trade-off between the 
greater convenience of dealing with a single firm, a 
monopoly, and that with a monopoly where there is no 
competition. A similar dilemma has in the past arisen in 
the case of “yellow pages”, where both advertisers and 
consumers would prefer a single provider so long as that 
provider did not abuse its monopoly position.
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33 This is made even worse in practice as the Directive 
omits a key part of the licensing process. Licensing 
music is a direct result of copyright law, especially the 
right to control the public performances of musical 
works and sound recordings. The Directive only sets 
licensing standards for the multi-territorial licensing 
of musical works. However, from a copyright 
point of view, performing a work in public, such 
as streaming or broadcasting it, requires a license 
covering the performance and the recording of the 
work. These are considered neighbouring rights and 
administered by a distinct and separate set of CMOs.
34 The clearest indication of this is the lack of 
streaming tariffs via CMOs for neighbouring rights. 
For example, in Germany a broadcaster needs a 
license from GEMA for the musical work and from 
GVL for the performance and the sound recording. 
For streaming the situation is more complicated and 
more fragmented. The GVL, for example, does not 
offer a streaming tariff on its homepage and in fact 
also does not mention how to acquire the license 
in practice. This means that a user has to contact 
the right holder directly - a very onerous process 
in practice, given the large number of record labels 
and other right holders involved. The situation is not 
any different in the other member states; in all our 
cases the access to neighbouring rights for online 
exploitation is limited in comparison to analogue 
uses (such as broadcasting). In this respect, it is 
unrealistic to expect users to acquire the correct 
license in a system that is vague, highly complex and 
unable to meet the demand. The failure of licensing 
practices to change quickly enough could actually 
harm the aim of copyright as a whole.
III. The Freedom of the Right Holder
35 For the user, the fragmentation of the rights is 
the root of the problem. However, the Directive 
explicitly allows copyright holders to split their 
rights into bundles, based on the type of right and the 
territorial scope. This results in a worsening of the 
situation: the administration of rights has become 
increasingly fragmented.64 In particular publishers 
and record labels can now administer their rights 
themselves, having withdrawn them from the 
CMO system.65 However, they have not withdrawn 
64 Cooke, Dissecting the Digital Dollar, Part One: How 
streaming services are licensed and the challenges artists 
now face (London: Music Managers Forum., 2015)
65 Arezzo , Competition and Intellectual Property Protection in 
The Market for the Provision of Multi-Territorial Licensing 
of Online Rights in Musical Works – Lights And Shadows 
of The New European Directive 2014/26/EU, International 
Review Of Intellectual Property And Competition Law 
2015, 545, Directive on collective management of copyright 
and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights 
the works as a whole, but instead only the online 
rights. In other words, while the CMO may be able 
to license the work for broadcasting, it cannot do so 
for online exploitation. This fragmentation places 
a substantial burden on CMOs and right holders to 
keep track of who holds what right to which work. 
This task should not be underestimated.66 Some 
CMOs themselves struggle to identify the specific 
works and rights that they administer.67
36 Secondly, by allowing not only CMOs but also 
independent rights management organisations 
(which focus on licensing without the collective 
component)68 to administer rights, the Directive 
has effectively endorsed the licensing Hubs. Given 
the demand for multi-territorial licenses, CMOs 
have had to cooperate with each other and with 
major publishers to offer multi-territorial licenses. 
While these Hubs are managed by the CMOs, they 
are distinct from them. This means that rather than 
competing with each other to offer multi-territorial 
licenses, CMOs are being hired by right holders to do 
this via a clearing house system. It also means that 
the usual social and collective features of the CMO, 
a key element in the justification of their existence 
is being marginalised.
37 In sum, the remedy which was supposed to bring 
about CMOs to provide multi-territorial licenses 
has instead cemented a fragmented system where 
it is not clear what a license covers. Right holders 
have got the power to choose where to register their 
rights. Their decision will be determined both by 
the nature and offerings of those who are willing 
to have the rights registered to them and the users 
of the services of those organisations, such as the 
streaming services themselves and their consumers. 
While it is unhelpful to look at this market through 
the lens of the theory of two-sided markets, it is 
important to keep in mind that to achieve the best 
in musical works for online use in the internal market 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive), Part III.
66 In this respect some may argue that the CMOs are simply 
left with the wrong “technology”, i.e. databases, which may 
make the intervention by the Commission look harsh. An 
unresolved question is whether the CMOs have been less 
innovative than on other sectors because they were part of 
a set of cosy monopolists or because there are some issues 
which make it fundamentally harder to bring music into the 
21st century.
67 Ranaivoson, Iglesias, and Vondracek, The Costs of Licensing 
for Online Music Services: An Exploratory Analysis for 
European States. Michigan State International Law Review 
2013, 674.
68 CMOs license works and use some of their income for 
services to the membership as whole, including social 
insurances, pensions and cross-subsidising of genres. Rights 
management organisations license works and distribute the 
income to the right holders, without providing broader 
services like CMOs do. As a result, the cross-subsidising from 
successful to less successful right holders is significantly 
more limited.
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financial outcome for the rights holders, creating 
appropriate bundles of music is clearly valuable.69 
In other words, there is a natural tendency to have 
CMOs that cover all works and represent all rights.
IV. Who Benefits?
38 In addition to the problems of rights fragmentation, 
there are questions concerning the benefit to 
be derived for the majority of authors. The clear 
winners of the changes are successful artists and 
large right holders, such as publishers and labels. 
They have the resources to administer their rights 
on their own.70 This trend has been most recently 
confirmed by Arezzo who sees the publishers as 
exploiting the new options.71 Withdrawal of rights 
in order to ensure efficient administration is not a 
realistic option for most right holders, a problem 
that is compounded by the fact that CMOs are not 
required to use a common language.
39 In addition to the practical and technical issues not 
addressed by the Directive, the Commission has 
69 Arezzo , Competition and Intellectual Property Protection in 
The Market for the Provision of Multi-Territorial Licensing 
of Online Rights in Musical Works – Lights And Shadows 
of The New European Directive 2014/26/EU, International 
Review Of Intellectual Property And Competition Law 2015, 
534-564.
70 Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights, WIPO 2002 (available at: <http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/855/wipo_pub_855.pdf>, 
last accessed 15/4/16), 97,Handke and Towse, Economics 
of Copyright Collecting Societies, SSRN 2007 (available 
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1159085>, last accessed 14/12/15), 10. They also have 
more lobbying power and it is important to be alert to 
the dangers that such lobbying power leads inappropriate 
regulation and potentially slower convergence.
71 Arezzo , Competition and Intellectual Property Protection in 
The Market for the Provision of Multi-Territorial Licensing of 
Online Rights in Musical Works – Lights And Shadows of The 
New European Directive 2014/26/EU, International Review 
Of Intellectual Property And Competition Law 2015, 534-564. 
For early predictions of this phenomenon, see Kretschmer 
et al, The Changing Location of Intellectual Property Rights 
in Music: A Study of Music Publishers, Collecting Societies 
and Media Conglomerates, Prometheus, 1999, 163- 186; the 
issue raised during the public consultation: Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
Comments on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on collective management of 
copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing 
of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal 
market (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2208971&download=yes>, last accessed 
13/10/16), especially para. 17; and evidence that this is 
already happening: 1709 Blog, Is Universal Publishing’s 
exit from collective licensing a step backwards for music 
industry ‘one stop’ aspirations? (available at: <http://
the1709blog.blogspot.nl/2013/02/is-universal-publishings-
exit-from.html>, last accessed 13/1/16).
a highly simplistic view of author preferences. It 
does not allow for how interests within the right 
holder group may differ. Larger right holders have 
an interest in leaving because, for them, economic 
performance is key.72 Successful artists and 
commercial copyright holders have an interest in 
generating revenue compared to a less successful 
artist who may rely on a wider distribution of their 
works in order to generate a fan base.73 In terms of 
rights administration, this translates into the larger 
owners preferring efficiency above other services 
that CMOs provide (for example, social insurance).
40 Following the Commission’s logic, relying 
on increased competition protected through 
competition law can make CMOs focus both on 
generating faster, more accurate practices, as 
well as lowering overheads. However, there is no 
accepted measure for CMO performance74 and 
therefore neither for “efficiency”. The one figure 
indicating the cost of rights administration for 
the copyright owner is the administration rate. It 
measures the percentage of royalties that are used 
for administration and indicates its relative cost. 
This is the only directly comparable figure which the 
CMO Directive requires to be published.75 Therefore, 
for copyright holders focusing on economic value a 
lower administration rate is more attractive. 
41 However, the reliance on administration rates 
has two major drawbacks. First, in a world where 
there is a choice between CMOs, this would seem 
an inadequate measure of performance. Having a 
measure which focuses solely on the cost side is 
rather limited, since an artist is interested in the 
absolute amount of money they receive. To be 
satisfied with the current measure would mean 
72 This is a well-known problem for cooperatives – and at least 
for some aspects of the business model, one can equate a 
CMO with a marketing cooperative. When cooperatives 
have members with very diverse interests and aims, the 
cooperative tends to malfunction and the more powerful 
members tend to leave as they can do better on their own. 
See e.g. Henriksen, Ingrid, Morten Hviid and Paul Sharp, 
2012, Law and peace: Contracts and the success of the 
Danish dairy cooperatives. The Journal of Economic History 
72, 197-224.
73 Kretschmer, Digital Copyright: the End of an Era. European 
Intellectual property Review 2003, 333-341.
74 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15), 6.
75 Directive on collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights 
in musical works for online use in the internal market 
(Directive 2014/26/EU) (CMO Directive), art 22 and Annex. 
All of the other indicators which need to be published are 
in absolute numbers, making them not directly comparable 
across CMOs. For example, the collected revenue strongly 
depends on the membership size, making the absolute value 
in Euros a relative figure.
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always preferring a CMO which had low costs, but 
which generated very little revenue, to one with 
high costs but also high revenue.  
42 Secondly, if CMOs choose to compete, as the 
Commission intends, it would be on the basis of 
the administration rate as an indicator of economic 
efficiency. This would attract the right holders with 
the most valuable repertoire. The administration fee 
is currently the same, irrespective of the actual cost 
of collection. However, as more successful works are 
easier to administer in practice, larger right holders 
are cross-subsiding less successful ones.76 They 
therefore have an incentive to leave and as a result, 
the cross-subsidy is likely to unravel.77 CMOs seeking 
to prevent this are more prone to the influence of 
these larger right holders. As their threat to exit is 
also the most credible, it will enhance their influence 
within CMOs.78 As CMOs have in practice significant 
leeway in determining both the tariffs as well as the 
distribution policies,79 smaller right holders are more 
likely to be losing out.
43 A possible casualty of a more economic/competition 
approach in this market is the demise of the social 
and cultural features of the old CMOs. These required 
a cross subsidy between artists. With the focus on the 
economic value of the organisation, the incentive 
to provide these subsidies will decrease. CMOs with 
a stronger social component would be left with 
repertoire of a lower market value, raising the 
costs per work even more.80 At the same time, it is 
hard to see the justification for these services being 
bundled with the other activities of a CMO and being 
protected through competition law. Channelling the 
funds from online exploitation and bypassing the 
established CMO system is likely to work in the same 
way.
44 This situation feeds back into one of the main 
issues raised by the effect of copyright. Copyright 
protection, and especially its strengthening, is 
usually linked to the harm it does to creators, rather 
76 Wallis, Kretschmer and Klimis, Contested Collective 
Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music- The 
Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity, 
European Journal of Communication 1999, 14-15.
77 Competition typically leads to an unravelling of cross 
subsidies.
78 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15), 10.
79 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15), 6.
80 Handke and Towse, Economics of Copyright Collecting 
Societies, SSRN 2007 (available at: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159085>, last accessed 
14/12/15), 10.
than to the larger corporations which do not create 
works, but exploit them. This concern derives from 
the assumption of “the romantic author”: the lone 
creator who works independently.81 This paradigm 
is further reinforced by the language used to 
describe unauthorised use, most notably the moral 
condemnation of piracy.82 A similar argument has 
been made in relation to the term “extension for 
performers”. Famous artists, such as Sir Cliff Richard, 
have actively lobbied on this basis.83 However, as the 
licensing regime moves away from income from 
shared performance rights as CMOs guarantee,84 
the benefits to the creator are further undermined. 
The fear is that the regime is increasingly serving 
the interests of the large stakeholders, whether 
corporate or individual.85
H. Conclusion
45 Our empirical investigation clearly shows that the 
current system in place for online music licenses 
is falling significantly short of the Commission’s 
aims.86 First, it is nearly impossible to determine 
who can offer an online license, and which works 
and territories it covers. The information asymmetry 
faced by users has been made even more problematic 
by Hubs with limited coverage because it increases 
the number of relevant players. (This issue has been 
81 For a more detailed description, see Rose, Authors and 
Owners (London: Harvard University Publishing, 1993) 
and Campbell, Authorship, incentives for Creation and 
Copyright in the 21st Century, Proceedings of the American 
Society for Information Science and Technology 2006.
82 Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights- The Berne Convention and Beyond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 21.
83 Atkinson, Sir Cliff Richard’s victory: an extra 20 years of 
copyright protection for sound recordings is only weeks 
away (available at: <http://www.technology-law-blog.
co.uk/2013/08/sir-cliff-richards-victory-an-extra-20-
years-of-copyright-protection-for-sound-recordings-is-
only-we.html>, last accessed 17/12/15).Cliff Richard does 
not write songs, he only performs them. This makes him a 
performer but not an author under copyright law. However, 
it shows how the notion of creativity has expanded over 
time.
84 Most commonly, the income is divided 1:1:1 between the 
composer, lyricist and publisher, with payments directly to 
the right holder.
85 For a detailed empirical analysis of copyright reforms from 
this angle, see Schroff, The evolution of copyright policies 
(1880-2010): a comparison between Germany, the UK, the US 
and the international level. Doctoral thesis at the University 
of East Anglia 2014 (available at <https://ueaeprints.uea.
ac.uk/49708/>, last accessed 15/4/16).
86 The same is true for the sales of digital music, see Gómez 
and Martens, Language, Copyright And Geographic 
Segmentation in the EU Digital Single Market for Music 
and Film, JRC/IPTS Digital Economy Working Paper 2015, 
(available at <http://ssrn.Com/Abstract=2603144>, last 
accessed 15/4/16).
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known for at least a decade, yet no obvious solution 
has emerged). Secondly, the price of licenses is also 
unknown. While a system of tariffs is supposed 
to reduce the transaction costs by addressing the 
information asymmetry, this is not the case for 
online licenses. Standard online licenses are not pan-
European. At the same time, there is virtually no 
information available on the cost of pan-European 
licenses as granted by Hubs. Thirdly, rather than 
competing with other CMOs, they are hiring out 
their administrative capabilities to large scale right 
holders, in particular publishers. All of the major 
Hubs are associated and run out of the offices of a 
major CMO, in particular PRS, GEMA, SACEM and 
SGAE. Their changes are not aimed at the individual 
creator but instead large intermediaries. As these 
Hubs are separated from the CMOs, the revenue 
they generate is separate too, and may therefore 
not contribute to the social/cultural aspects of 
the CMOs’ work. In other words, CMOs are helping 
large right holders to channel income past the 
established system. As the major CMOs are already 
complying with the CMO Directive’s provisions on 
multi-territorial licensing, we are left to ask: what 
is wrong with the EU’s attempt to meet the demands 
of digitalisation?
46 The current insistence on rights being entrusted 
by the right holder to a single CMO exacerbates 
the problems. Right holders are unable to create 
competition through multi-homing. As Katz argues, 
CMOs were not necessarily natural monopolies under 
the analogue regime and are even less likely to be so 
under the new digital regime.87 Some components, 
such as the databases of works and right holders 
may be, but the collection of revenue and the single 
assignment of rights clearly need not be. Because 
there is a strong commercial interest on the part of 
all stakeholders to have a comprehensive CMO — at 
least within genres — monopolies are likely to emerge 
naturally. It is difficult to see how competition will 
remain. Whether this will ultimately lead all to be 
in the same organisation or bodies organised along 
the lines of a particular repertoire is difficult to 
predict. One thing which seems abundantly clear is 
that national organisations are unlikely to survive. 
By allowing right holders to assign their rights in 
any way they want, but not permitting simultaneous 
assignment,88 the result is likely to be a new system 
87 Katz, The potential demise of another natural monopoly: 
Rethinking the collective administration of performing 
rights, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2015, 
541-593, Katz, The potential demise of another natural 
monopoly: New technologies and the administration 
of performing rights. Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 2006, 245-284.
88 Under article 31 CMO Directive, simultaneous assignment 
is possible in the very limited circumstances that the CMO 
which usually administers the online use of works does 
not offer multi-territorial licenses and has not mandated 
another CMO to do so under the passport system. However, 
of monopolies or oligopolies. The only difference 
will be the basis of the distinction, from national 
monopolies to repertoire-based ones.
47 Our reading of the Directive and our case studies 
suggest that:
• By mis-conceptualising CMOs, the remedies to 
ensure more competition have had unintended 
effects – for instance, the creation of clearing 
houses managed by CMOs rather than 
competition between CMOs;
• The Directive does not go far enough — rights 
are still assigned on an exclusive basis and 
therefore cannot be assigned to several agents 
at the same time;89
• In the matter of non-exclusive rights assignment 
several CMOs can license a work, so the user is 
not detrimentally affected; at the same time, 
right holders can exclude some badly managed 
CMOs, while remaining within the licensing 
regime.
48 Our research has also enabled us to identify a number 
of further questions:
• Given that licensing is intimately linked to 
the copyright system, should the copyright 
system be reformed to accommodate changes 
in licensing - in particular, for the protection of 
consumers and less successful authors?
• Are performing rights and their licensing really 
different from other works and rights (for 
example, e-books)?
• What problems should a reformed licensing 
system address? Is streaming equivalent to 
other disruptive technologies and/or initiatives 
in other markets such as Uber and Airbnb? 
49 Given the importance of licensing practice to the 
even in this case the multi-territorial online use cannot 
only be assigned to one other CMO. It is therefore still a 
single CMO which can provide the license in practice.
89 It is not required by the Directive that the same right for 
the same work is assignable to more than one CMO. Indeed, 
exploitation contracts explicitly prevent this. See for 
example: BUMA/ STEMRA, Exploitatiecontract A (auteur) 
(available at: <http://www.bumastemra.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2015/05/PV2.BUM_.512.0914.08-A3-SPEC-
Exploitatiecontract-A-auteur-def.-d.d.-03.10.2014.pdf>, last 
accessed 13/10), art 2(3) or GEMA, Berechtigungsvertrag 
(Fassung April 2016) (available at: <https://www.gema.de/
fileadmin/user_upload/Gema/Berechtigungsvertrag.pdf>, 
last accessed 13/10/16), art. 1 and 1a; PRS for Music, Articles 
of Association (available at: <https://www.prsformusic.
com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-PRS/prs-
memorandum-articles.pdf>, last accessed 13/10/16), art. 7.
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legitimacy and effectiveness of copyright more 
broadly, linking the two directly at EU level is a 
potential avenue of fruitful reform. Although beyond 
the scope of this paper, future research should 
investigate how the effect of copyright is shaped 
by the licensing process. Key to this is the current 
absence of copyright contract law rules to cushion 
the effect of changes in the licensing practices for 
less successful artists. Furthermore, research should 
investigate the option of resorting to harmonisation 
(potentially in combination with a re-adjusted 
competition approach), as was done in areas of 
protection to standardise licensing practices and 
the availability of licenses across borders. Examining 
the effects of copyright in this context is especially 
important, given the on-going EU copyright review.
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